Seton Hall University

eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship

Seton Hall Law

2015

A Right With No Remedy: The Fourth
Amendment, §1983, & Qualified Immunity
Daniel Holzapfel

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Holzapfel, Daniel, "A Right With No Remedy: The Fourth Amendment, §1983, & Qualified Immunity" (2015). Law School Student
Scholarship. 816.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/816

A Right With No Remedy:
The Fourth Amendment, §1983, & Qualified Immunity

Daniel Holzapfel
December 2, 2014
Professor Ristroph

I.

Abstract

In the age of cell phone cameras and social media, the use of excessive force by police
officers has become a widely discussed and highly publicized topic. Recently, a national
discussion on the issue has been spurred on by cases like that of Michael Brown, an unarmed
teenager who was shot and killed by a police officer in Ferguson, Missouri, and that of Eric
Garner, a 43 year old unarmed man suspected of selling untaxed cigarettes who died after being
placed in a chokehold by a New York City police officer. Both of these cases have been followed
very closely by the media with a focus on the underlying societal and racial issues they highlight;
Both Brown and Garner were black men, and each incident involved a white police officer. From
a legal standpoint, the media has paid close attention to whether or not grand juries in each case
would decide to indict the individual officers on criminal charges in their respective states. So
far, the grand jury in Ferguson has returned a decision not to indict Officer Darren Wilson. Since
the decision was announced, the focus of the media and the nation has remained focused on the
perceived racial divide in the country, and the protests and riots that have ensued in response to
the decision. One question that has not grabbed headlines following the decision is from a legal
standpoint, what, if anything, can the Brown family do now? One possibility, and the subject of
this article, is for the family to pursue a 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 civil damages claim in federal court
against Officer Wilson for the deprivation of their son’s Fourth Amendment rights. 1 However, as
this article will endeavor to explain, the Brown family’s likelihood of success on such a claim is
considerably low. While in theory §1983 gives a glimmer of hope to those who have been

1

42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West).

deprived of their Fourth Amendment rights, in reality §1983 claims for excessive provide a
meaningful remedy in only the most egregious cases.

II.

Introduction

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the use of excessive
force by police in effecting arrests and other seizures. It provides in part, “The right of the people
to be secure in their persons…against unreasonable … seizures…”

2

When a person believes he

or she has been subject to excessive force at the hands of a police officer during a stop or arrest
he or she may bring a civil action against the officer for tortious deprivation of their
constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.3 However, the ability to bring a §1983 claim is
by no means a guarantee that the claim will be brought successfully. One potential roadblock to a
successful §1983 claim is the defense of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is not provided
for within §1983 itself, but is a court created defense based on the common law good faith and
probable cause defense.4 The defense offers police officers immunity from suit and protection
from liability for damages.5 As immunity from suit, the applicability of the qualified immunity
defense should be determined at the summary judgment stage.6 In analyzing the qualified

2

U.S. Const. amend. IV.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken
in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to
the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.”).
4 Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 170, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 1834-35, 118 L. Ed. 2d 504 (1992) (“The good-faith and
probable-cause defense evolved into our modern qualified-immunity doctrine.”).
5 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 512, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 2808, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1985).
6 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982).
3

immunity defense in a particular case courts look at two questions, did the defendant’s actions
violate a constitutional right, and was the right in question clearly established at the time so as to
put a reasonable person on notice that the right existed.7 Courts have the discretion to address
these questions in any order, and in some instances where one question is dispositive courts may
need to only address one inquiry or the other. 8 This discretion allows courts the ability to dispose
of cases quickly without ever addressing the merits of the underlying constitutional claim. The
freedom courts have to avoid constitutional questions in qualified immunity analysis is
particularly problematic in the Fourth Amendment excessive force context. As will be discussed
further below, unlike §1983 claims in other constitutional contexts, the §1983 claim in the Fourth
Amendment excessive force context is the primary means by which people can seek to have their
rights vindicated.9 Accordingly, the courts’ broad discretion to analyze qualified immunity
claims without addressing underlying constitutional questions, creates the potential for the
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive force by police officers in the course of an arrest,
stop, or other seizure to essentially become a right with no remedy.
This article will proceed by first addressing the Fourth Amendment standard for
determining when the use of force by a police officer effecting an arrest or other seizure amounts
to excessive force in violation of the Constitution. It will then move on to a discussion of the
§1983 claim, its history, elements, and how its application today is far broader than it was at its
inception. Next, it will examine the defense of qualified immunity, and provide an analysis of
two important cases Saucier, in which the Supreme Court found that in addressing the qualified
immunity defense courts must first address the merits of the constitutional question before
7

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 194, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2152, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001).
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 225, 129 S. Ct. 808, 812, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009).
9 John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009 Sup. Ct. Rev. 115, 135 (2009)
(discussing that constitutional tort actions may be the primary means of vindicating rights in exce ssive force cases).
8

moving to the “clearly established” or qualified immunity question, and Pearson, in which the
Supreme Court receded from Saucier and gave courts the discretion to determine sequencing.
The analysis will continue with a look at how §1983 claims in the excessive force context are
unique in comparison to §1983 in other constitutional contexts in the sense that §1983 is
essentially the only available means of vindicating rights deprived by police excessive force. It
will also discuss how this uniqueness, coupled with the discretion given to courts in Pearson
creates the troubling potential for the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on police use of
excessive force to become nothing more than a theoretical right with no actual remedy. Finally,
this article will conclude that to prevent the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on police use of
excessive force from becoming nothing more than a theoretical right, courts must address the
constitutional merits of §1983 excessive force claims.

II.

The Fourth Amendment & Excessive Force: From Garner to Graham

The appropriate standard for analyzing the constitutionality of police uses of force in the
course of an arrest, or “seizure” of a free citizen was articulated almost 30 years ago in
Tennessee v. Garner.10 In Garner, the Supreme Court analyzed the constitutionality of using
lethal force to prevent the escape of a suspected felon. 11 Recognizing that using lethal force to
apprehend a suspect constitutes a “seizure”, the Court determined that the officer’s use of force
was subject to the “reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”12 In determining the
reasonableness of a particular seizure the Court in Garner applied a balancing test, balancing
“the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against
10

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 85 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985).
Id. at 3.
12 Id. at 7
11

the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.”13 Applying the
balancing test discussed in Garner to the facts of a specific excessive force case illustrates that
the ultimate inquiry in such cases is whether given the totality of the circumstances the
“particular sort of… seizure” was justified. 14
Despite the Supreme Court’s application of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness
standard in Garner, lower courts did not immediately adopt the Supreme Court’s approach in
analyzing their own cases of excessive force.15 Courts were divided on whether to address claims
of excessive force in the course of an arrest or seizure under a Fourth Amendment standard or a
Fourteenth Amendment due process standard. 16 The division amongst federal courts on whether
to apply a Fourth or Fourteenth amendment standard may have been attributable to a belief that
both standards were applicable to claims of excessive force during an arrest. 17 The lack of
reliance on Garner may also have been due in part to a misunderstanding among courts that
excessive force claims involving seizures effected by lethal force are distinct, and deserve a
distinct constitutional inquiry from that used in excessive force cases involving less than lethal
force.18 However, such a view is not consistent with the idea that force is measured on a sliding
scale, or the use of force continuum as it is referred to by many law enforcement agencies across

13

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1699, 85 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985).
Id. at 8-9.
15 See, e.g., Fernandez v. Leonard, 784 F.2d 1209 (1st Cir. 1986); Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319 (2d
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 922 (1987) (adopting 14th Amendment due process standard.).
16 Id.; See also, Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 1987) (concluding that the proper standard for
analyzing excessive force in the arrest context is the Fourth Amendment standard.).
17 See, e.g., Leber v. Smith, 773 F.2d 101 (6th Cir.1985) (applying Fourth Amendment standard where a police
officer drew his gun in attempting to arrest a mentally disturbed motorist); Lewis v. Downs, 774 F.2d 711 (6th
Cir.1985) (applying a Fourteenth Amendment due process standard where police officers kicked a handcuffed
woman, and struck her husband and son with nightsticks during an arrest).
18 This is evidenced by courts continued use of substantive due process standard in analyzing constitutionality of
arrests involving less than lethal force despite Garner’s application of a Fourth Amendment reasonableness standa rd.
See, e.g. supra note 15.
14

the country.19 Although there is no standard use of force continuum accepted nationally, most
begin with mere officer presence and/or verbal commands and end with lethal force. 20 Lethal
force is not outside the confines of a use of force continuum; it is merely at the far-end. Still,
regardless of why the division existed among federal courts pre and post Garner, any confusion
was resolved by the Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. Connor.21
In Graham, the Supreme Court made “explicit what was implicit in Garner’s analysis
and [held] that all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force- deadly or notin the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other “seizure” of a free citizen should be
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its reasonableness standard, rather than a
“substantive due process” approach…”22 In relying on the Fourth Amendment for guidance, the
Court in Graham announced an objective reasonableness standard. 23 That is, a standard that
views the use of force through the eyes of a reasonable officer on site, without the benefit of
20/20 hindsight.24 As in Garner, the Court in Graham noted that the objective reasonableness
standard of the Fourth Amendment is a balancing test.25 The test looks to balance the nature and
quality of the intrusion on an individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against governmental
interests.26 The test considers elements including the severity of the crime, immediacy of the
threat to police or others, and whether the suspect is resisting or attempting to flee, and keeps an

19

Ryan P. Hatch, Coming Together to Resolve Police Misconduct: The Emergence of Mediation As A New Solution ,
21 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 447, 478-79 (2006) (describing the “use of force continuum”).
20 Ryan P. Hatch, Coming Together to Resolve Police Misconduct: The Emergence of Mediation As A New Solution ,
21 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 447, 478-79 (2006) (providing an example of a typical use of force continuum
consisting of six levels starting with officer presence and end ing with deadly force).
21 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 386, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1866-67, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (U.S. 1989).
22 Id. at 395.
23 Id. at 386.
24 Id. at 396.
25 Id.
26 Id.

ever mindful eye toward the reality that officers are regularly required to make-split second
decisions in dangerous situations.27

III.

How §1983 Came to Be: History, Elements, & Expanded Interpretation
Although the Fourth Amendment confers the right to be free from “unreasonable

seizures”, and in turn prohibits police use of excessive force in effecting such seizures, it
provides no remedy for those individuals whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated. 28
The remedy for such violations comes in the form of 42 U.S.C. §1983. §1983 was enacted in
1871 as part of what is often referred to as the “Ku Klux Klan Act”, but is more formally known
as the Civil Rights Act of 1871.29 The primary purpose behind the Civil Rights Act was to
provide a civil remedy against the abuses that were being committed in the South after the Civil
War.30 The Act itself conferred no rights on citizens, but rather gave them a vehicle by which
they could seek recompense for violations of the rights granted to them by the Constitution. 31
§1983 claims consist of four elements derived directly from the language of the statute.
First, the claim must be brought against a “person”. 32 “Person” under §1983 includes federal,
state, and local employees in their individual capacities. It also includes municipalities and local
governments.33 However, it does not include states, or the United States Government. 34 The

27

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1866-67, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (U.S. 1989).
U.S. Const. amend. IV. (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.”).
29 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171, 81 S. Ct. 473, 475, 5 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1961).
30 See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1871).
31 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1870, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (U.S. 1989).
32 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
33 6 Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 11:308.
34 Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 58, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2305, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1989).
28

second element of §1983 is that the person acted “under color of [law]”. 35 This requires that
defendant exercised power by “virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer
is clothed with the authority of state law.”36 The understanding of “under color of [law]” was
originally narrowly tailored to include only official’s actions taken on the basis of actual state
authority or law, not inclusive of any abuses of authority or violations of state law by such
officials.37 However, the interpretation of “under color of [law]” was expanded in Monroe v.
Pape to include such abuses of power and violations of law committed by state officials while
acting in their official capacity.38 The third element of §1983 claims is that the defendant’s
action “subjects or causes to be subjected any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof”, to the deprivation of rights.39 This is the causal connection
component of §1983 claims. The deprivation of rights must be the result of the defendant’s
conduct for liability to attach.40 The final element of §1983 claims is that plaintiff’s rights are in
fact deprived.41 While §1983 itself does not provide any substantive rights to citizens, it is the
vehicle by which citizens can seek to be compensated for the deprivation of rights provided to
them elsewhere.42 Accordingly, for a §1983 claim to survive, plaintiffs must show that a right
conferred either by the United States Constitution or some other federal statute has in fact been
deprived.43

35

42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184, 81 S. Ct. 473, 482, 5 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1961).
45 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 202, 81 S. Ct. 473, 492, 5 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
38 Id.
39 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
40 Teressa E. Ravenell, Blame It on the Man: Theorizing the Relationship Between S 1983 Municipal Liability and
the Qualified Immunity Defense, 41 Seton Hall L. Rev. 153, 159 (2011).
41 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
42 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1870, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (U.S. 1989).
43 § 3573.2Section 1983 Actions—Scope of Action: Elements of Claim, Remedies, 13D Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. §
3573.2 (3d ed.).
36

From the start, §1983 was intended to provide a federal cause of action supplemental to
any state cause of action for the deprivation of individual’s rights by officials acting under color
of state law.44 However, the original interpretation of §1983, specifically the language “under
color of [law]” was narrow, and accordingly, the availability of §1983 was limited. Justice
Frankfurter’s dissent in Monroe v. Pape illustrates just how narrow that interpretation had been
in the years following its enactment. In his dissent Justice Frankfurter states in part:
We must determine what Congress meant by ‘under color’ of enumerated state authority.
Congress used that phrase not only in R.S. s 1979, but also in the criminal provisions of s
2 of the First Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 27, from which is derived the
present 18 U.S.C. s 242, 18 U.S.C.A. s 242, and in both cases used it with the same
purpose. During the seventy year which followed these enactments, cases in this Court in
which the ‘under color’ provisions were invoked uniformly involved action taken either
in strict pursuance of some specific command of state law or within the scope of executive
discretion in the administration of state laws.45
The idea behind the narrow view of “under color of [law]” held by Justice Frankfurter and many
courts prior to Monroe rests on the idea that when an official acts outside of their given authority
they can no longer be considered state actors. 46

44

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183, 81 S. Ct. 473, 482, 5 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1961)
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 202, 81 S. Ct. 473, 492, 5 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citing
Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317, 330, 5 S.Ct. 928, 962, 29 L.Ed. 202, 207; Bowman v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co.,
115 U.S. 611, 6 S.Ct. 192, 29 L.Ed. 502; Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 23 S.Ct. 639, 47 L.Ed. 909; Devine v. City of
Los Angeles, 202 U.S. 313, 26 S.Ct. 652, 50 L.Ed. 1046; Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 35 S.Ct. 932, 59 L.Ed.
1349; Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 47 S.Ct. 446, 71 L.Ed. 759; Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 59 S.Ct. 872, 83
L.Ed. 1281; Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 63 S.Ct. 882, 87 L.Ed. 1324.).
46 Id. at 242-43 (“In concluding that police intrusion in violation of state law is not a wrong remediable under R.S. s
1979, the pressures which urge an opposite result are duly felt. The difficulties which confront **514 private
citizens who seek to vindicate in traditional common-law actions their state-created rights against lawless invasion
of their privacy by local policemen are obvious,70 and obvious is the need for more effective modes of redress. The
answer to these urgings must be regard for our federal system which presupposes a wide range of regional autonomy
in the kinds of protection local residents receive. If various common-law concepts make it possible for a
policeman—but no more possible for a policeman than for any individual hoodlum intruder—to escape without
liability when he has vandalized a home, that is an evil. But, surely, its remedy devolves, in the first instance, on the
States. Of course, if the States afford less protection against the police, as police, than against the hoodlum—if under
authority of state ‘statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage’ the police are specially shielded — *243 s 1979
provides a remedy which dismissal of petitioners' complaint in the present case does not impair. Otherwise, the
protection of the people from local delinquencies and shortcomings depends, as in general it must, upon the active
consciences of state executives, legislators and judges.71 Federal intervention, which must at best be limited to
securing those minimal guarantees afforded by the evolving concepts of due process and equal protection, may in
45

In Monroe v. Pape, the Supreme Court reviewed a case from Chicago involving police
officers that broke into the home of an African American family without a warrant. 47 Once
inside, the police woke the family up, made them stand naked in the living room, and tore the
house apart.48 The police then proceeded to take the father of the family, Mr. Monroe, to the
police station where they interrogated him regarding a murder case, and did not allow him to
make any calls or contact a lawyer. 49 Eventually, the police released Mr. Monroe without
charging him.50 The Monroe family subsequently brought a §1983 claim against the police
alleging that they had violated their civil rights. 51 In reviewing the case, the Court overturned the
lower court’s decision to dismiss Mr. Monroe’s complaint. 52 In doing so, the Court held that
“under color of [law]” included actions by officials that were not explicitly authorized by the
laws of the state, and further that individuals could seek redress in federal court under §1983
without first resorting to state law remedies. 53
The expansion of the understanding of “under color of [law]” in Monroe has allowed far
more people to bring §1983 actions. Still, even if a plaintiff brings a claim that satisfies the
essential elements of §1983, they may not yet be home free. Defendants in these cases, as in any
case, have defenses available to them. 54 These defenses can pose a significant roadblock for
individuals seeking to have their rights vindicated. Under the current state of the law, in some

the long run do the individual a disservice by deflecting responsibility from the state lawmakers, who hold the power
of providing a far more comprehensive scope of protection. Local society, also, may well be the loser, by relaxing its
sense of responsibility and, indeed, perhaps resenting what may appear to it to be outside interference where local
authority is ample and more appropriate to supply needed remedies.”).
47 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S. Ct. 473, 5 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1961).
48 Id. at 169.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 167.
52 Id. at 191-92.
53 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174-75, 81 S. Ct. 473, 477, 5 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1961).
54 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 642-43, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3040-41, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987) (acknowledging
defense of absolute and qualified immunity in §1983 actions).

cases these defenses prevent plaintiffs from obtaining a decision as to the merits of their case,
and in even more cases them effectively deny any possibility of recovery.55 One of the most
common defenses to §1983, and the most relevant for purposes of this article, is the defense of
qualified immunity.

IV.

Qualified Immunity & The Order-of-Battle
Qualified immunity is a defense that applies in many §1983 cases. It protects government

officials from liability for civil damages when their conduct does not violate a clearly established
statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. 56 However, it is
not merely immunity from liability, but immunity from suit altogether.57 Accordingly, qualified
immunity determinations should be made at the earliest possible point in the litigation prior to
any discovery.58 This means qualified immunity questions are to be answered at the summary

55

Currently courts have discretion to determine sequencing in qualified immunity analysis leaving open the
possibility that constitutional questions will be avoided, and cases resolved solely on the qualified immunity
question. Even where the constitutional question is answered, if the right had not been clearly established prior to
the determination in the case at hand, then that particular defendant will still be granted qualified immunity based on
the “clearly established” prong of the qualified immunity analysis; effectively denying an award of damages
regardless of the constitutional violation. The discretionary constitutional determinations are merely prospective,
and subsequent police officers who exhibit similar behavior will not get the benefit of qua lified immunity the next
time around. See generally, Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S. Ct. 808, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009).
56 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982) (holding that “that
government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.”).
57 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 512, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 2808, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1985).
58 Id. at 526 (stating the Harlow Court refashioned the qualified immunity doctrine in such a way as to “permit the
resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment” and to avoid “subject[ing] government officials
either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery” in cases where the legal norms the officials
are alleged to have violated were not clearly established at the time.); See also, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
815, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2736-37, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982).

judgment stage.59 If a case moves past the summary judgment stage without having addressed
qualified immunity the defense is effectively waived. 60
The underlying principle of qualified immunity is to avoid imposing liability on officers
for their actions based on newly imposed laws.61 In one case, the Court described the purpose of
qualified immunity, saying “Qualified immunity balances two important interests- the need to
hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield
officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.”62
Qualified Immunity protects officials for reasonable mistakes made in their official capacity, be
it mistakes of fact, law, or both.63 However, qualified immunity is not absolute immunity.
In its earliest form, qualified immunity was akin to the common law good faith defense,
in that it had a subjective element to it. 64 This subjective element, that the defendant “took the
action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other
injury”,65 made it easy for plaintiff’s to defeat defendants’ summary judgment motions based on
qualified immunity, because the subjective intent of the officer was hard to determine without
further inquiry.66 In fact, some courts have contemplated that a question of subjective intent is a
question of fact that should be left to a jury, not decided on a motion for summary judgment. 67

59

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 512, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 2808, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1985).
Id. (“Such entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like absolute immunity,
it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.”).
61 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 224, 129 S. Ct. 808, 811, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009).
62 Id. at 231.
63 Id.
64 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982).
65 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 801, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2729, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982).
66 Id. at 816-17.
67 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2737, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982) (footnoting E.g.,
Landrum v. Moats, 576 F.2d 1320, 1329 (CA8 1978); Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 832–833 (CA2 1977);
cf. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S., at 120 n.9, 99 S.Ct., at 2680, n.9 (questioning whether the existence of “actual
malice,” as an issue of fact, may properly be decided on summary judgment in a suit alleging libel of a public
figure).
60

With a subjective prong to the qualified immunity test, even bare bones allegations of malice in
the face of a defendant’s claim for the defense could lead to extensive discovery.68 However, as a
defense from suit, trial costs and the costs of in-depth discovery were the types of things
qualified immunity was meant to protect officials from in the first place.69
Eventually, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court was given the chance to resolve
the inconsistency between the subjective-prong of the qualified immunity test, and the intent
behind the defense.70 In Harlow, the Court made quick work of eliminating the subjective
portion of the analysis, opting for an objective test with the goal of allowing judges to dismiss
frivolous suits at the summary judgment stage. 71 The Court noted in its decision that, “bare
allegations of malice should not suffice to subject government officials either to the costs of trial
or the burdens of broad-reaching discovery.”72 The new standard for qualified immunity as
articulated in Harlow is that “officials…. generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.”73 After Harlow, it became clear that there are
two questions at the heart of qualified immunity claims. The court must decide whether the
defendant’s actions violated a constitutional or statutory right, and also whether the right was
clearly established at the time so as to put a reasonable person on notice that the right existed.74
However, the order-of-battle, as it has come to be known, would not be addressed until years
later.

68

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816-17, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2737, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982)
Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 808.
72 Supra note 68.
73 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 801, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2729, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982).
74 Id.
69

In the 2001 decision in Saucier v. Katz, the Supreme Court addressed for the first time the
order-of-battle in determining whether to grant defendants qualified immunity in constitutional
tort cases.75 The order-of-battle as it is commonly referred to asks in what sequence should
courts address the questions underlying qualified immunity. In Saucier, despite disagreement
amongst the Justices, the Court found that the mandatory sequence in which courts should
address the questions underlying qualified immunity is to first address the constitutional
question, and then answer the qualified immunity question, that being whether the right was
clearly established.76 Essentially, under Saucier, courts must first determine the merits of the
plaintiff’s constitutional claim before turning to the question of qualified immunity. 77 In support
of its opinion, the Court noted that the rule set out in Saucier encourages the development of
constitutional law, and provides crucial guidance to officials in terms of what the Constitution
requires.78 Lower courts were not overly pleased with the ruling of Saucier.79 One court
questioned the sequencing rule stating “Whether [the Saucier] rule is absolute may be
doubted”.80 Still other courts deliberately disobeyed Saucier, and declined to apply mandatory
sequencing where the question of qualified immunity could be answered without resolving the
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constitutional issue. In one such instance the Sixth Circuit justified its avoidance of Saucier’s
sequencing declaring “We do not reach the issue of whether [plaintiff’s] Sixth Amendment rights
were violated, because principles of judicial restraint caution us to avoid reaching constitutional
questions when they are unnecessary to the disposition of the case.”81 Even members of the
Supreme Court criticized Saucier at the time it was decided and afterward. 82 In Morse v.
Frederick, Justice Breyer described Saucier’s sequencing as a “failed…experiment”.83 Again, in
Bunting v. Mellen, Justice Ginsburg described mandatory sequencing as the, “unwise judge-made
rule under which courts must decide whether the plaintiff has alleged a constitutional violation
before addressing the question whether the defendant state actor is entitled to qualified
immunity.”84 Even in the Saucier decision itself Justice Ginsburg in her concurrence stated, “The
two-part test today’s decision imposes holds large potential to confuse.”85 It seemed that one of
the main concerns over Saucier’s mandatory sequencing was that it forced courts to decide the
constitutional question, a fact sensitive inquiry, at the summary judgment stage, while in many
cases courts felt that the constitutional determination was not necessary to the ultimate qualified
immunity decision.86 What Saucier forced upon courts was exactly the type of situation that
Harlow’s removal of the subjective prong from the qualified immunity test looked to avoid. Still,
Saucier’s sequencing was far from unworkable.
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Scott v. Harris provides a great illustration of the Supreme Court’s application of the
mandatory sequencing laid out in Saucier.87 Scott also shows that despite the fact bound nature
of the constitutional question in qualified immunity analyses the question can still be resolved on
motion for summary judgment.88 Scott was a case that involved a high-speed police chase
wherein an officer rammed the fleeing suspect’s vehicle with his patrol car leaving the 19-yearold suspect a quadriplegic.89 There was a video recording of the chase. 90 The Eleventh Circuit
had determined that the officer’s actions were in violation of a clearly established constitutional
right, following the mandatory sequencing of Saucier.91 In reviewing the decision below, the
Supreme Court noted that it must first “resolve a “threshold question: Taken in the light most
favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct
violated a constitutional right?” The Court continued, laying out the second part of the Saucier
sequence stating, “If, and only if, the court finds a violation of a constitutional right, “the next,
sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established…in light of the specific context
of the case.”92 Turning to the threshold inquiry, the Court applied the Fourth Amendment’s
objective reasonableness standards to the facts before them, noting that despite the desire for an
“easy-to-apply legal test” there was no way to analyze the constitutional question, but to “slosh
through the fact bound morass of “reasonableness.”93 Getting to the facts of the case, and relying
on the video taped account, the Court looked at a number of factors essentially performing the
requisite balancing test.94 The Court noted that despite the dangers posed to the fleeing suspect
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by the officer’s actions, that danger did not compare to the “certainty of death” presented in a
case in which an officer shoots a fleeing felon. 95 The Court further noted, that the fleeing suspect
himself posed a high risk of harm to any pedestrians or bystanders. 96 Relying on the video of the
incident, the Court pointed out that “multiple police cars, with blue lights flashing and sirens
blaring, had been chasing respondent for nearly 10 miles, but he ignored their warning to stop.97
By contrast, those who might have been harmed had Scott not taken the action he did were
entirely innocent.”98 On those facts the Court found that no reasonable juror could have found
the force used to be unreasonable, and that summary judgment was warranted.99 The Court held:
“A police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives
of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment even when it places the fleeing
motorist at risk of serious injury or death.”100 Because the Court found no constitutional
violation, the second question of the mandatory sequence, whether the right was clearly
established, was unnecessary.
Despite the Supreme Court’s ability to apply the procedure laid out in Saucier, lower
courts nonetheless persisted in their distaste for mandatory sequencing in qualified immunity
cases.101 In fact, despite the binding nature of Saucier, some lower courts simply declined to
follow its holding.102 The issues with the mandatory sequencing regime were not only illustrated
by lower court defiance, or lower court decisions. 103 In Bunting v. Mullen, a case in which the
Supreme Court denied certiorari, the Court highlighted one of the strongest arguments for those
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opposed to mandatory sequencing.104 Bunting presented an establishment clause case involving
the constitutionality of a supper prayer at a state-run military college.105 Although the General
who required cadets to participate in the prayer was granted qualified immunity, the Fourth
Circuit still determined that the prayer requirement did violate the Establishment Clause. 106
Following the Fourth Circuit’s decision, despite having prevailed on qualified immunity
grounds, General Bunting sought review of the lower court’s constitutional determination. The
Supreme Court denied certiorari, and in a dissent by Justice Scalia, which was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Scalia discussed the negative implications that the denial illustrated. 107 In his
dissent, Scalia pointed out the “procedural tangle” that the decision represented. This procedural
tangle essentially meant that defendants who were successful on qualified immunity grounds lost
the ability to obtain appellate review of prospective constitutional determinations; regardless of
the negative impact they might have on the defendant. In the Bunting context this negative
impact would be that the school could no longer hold a prayer prior to supper. Despite
recognizing the “procedural tangle” described by Scalia, the majority in Bunting considered the
procedural shortcoming a “byproduct” of Saucier’s mandated sequencing.108
Eventually, the Supreme Court had a second chance to address the decision it made in
Saucier.109 In Pearson v. Callahan, reevaluated Saucier’s mandatory sequencing regime, noting
some common criticisms of the merits first procedure. 110 The Court first noted that
“[Sequencing] may result in a substantial expenditure of scarce judicial resources on difficult
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questions that have no effect on the case's outcome, and waste the parties' resources by forcing
them to assume the costs of litigating constitutional questions and endure delays attributable to
resolving those questions when the suit otherwise could be disposed of more readily. ”111 The
Court also noted that although Saucier was intended to promote elaboration of constitutional law,
in many cases where the constitutional question is addressed, courts fail to provide any
meaningful addition or elaboration of the law, generally because the cases are highly fact
sensitive.112 The Court also noted “the first step may create a risk of bad decision-making, as
where the briefing of constitutional questions is woefully inadequate.”113 The Court further
pointed out the issue presented in Bunting that application of Saucier might make it difficult “for
affected parties to obtain appellate review of constitutional decisions having a serious
prospective effect on their operations. For example, where a court holds that a defendant has
committed a constitutional violation, but then holds that the violatio n was not clearly established,
the defendant, as the winning party, may have his right to appeal the adverse constitutional
holding challenged.”114 The Court further pointed that, “because rigid adherence to Saucier
departs from the general rule of constitutional avoidance, the Court may appropriately decline to
mandate the order of decision that the lower courts must follow.” adding, “This flexibility
properly reflects the Court's respect for the lower federal courts.”115 While the Court remained
generally neutral in its opinion in Pearson, conceding that in many cases the Saucier sequence
may be advantageous, it determined that sequencing should be left to the discretion of individual
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judges.116 Still, while many courts got what they wanted with the discretion and flexibility
granted in Pearson117 , the discretion the Court gave might have been too broad.

VI.

An Exception to Discretion: Merits First for Excessive Force
Since Pearson was decided in 2009 one of the strongest justifications in support of the

Supreme Court’s decision to move away from Saucier’s mandatory sequencing has become
outdated. In the 2011 case of Camreta v. Greene, the Supreme Court went against what it had
previously stated in Bunting, and decided that it could review constitutional determinations that
were unfavorable to a defendant who had won his case in a lower court on qualified immunity
grounds.118 The decision essentially untangled the “procedural tangle” formerly caused by
Saucier’s requirements. The untangling in Camreta relieved some of the concern expressed in
Pearson over the application of the two-step Saucier procedure in certain cases.119 Nevertheless,
despite Saucier’s sequencing being advantageous in many cases, and the Court’s recent decision
in Camreta effectively resolving the procedural issue raised in Bunting, the discretion granted in
Pearson, if exercised appropriately, can still be very beneficial. 120 For example, in a case where
the constitutional question posed in the qualified immunity analysis is similar to a constitutional
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question in a case pending before a higher court it makes sense from a judicial economy
standpoint to give the lower court the discretion to avoid answering the question. 121
Although Saucier’s mandatory sequencing is clearly still beneficial in many instances, a
complete reversion to the holding of Saucier is not warranted or necessary. What is necessary,
however, is a qualification to the broad discretion of Pearson, and a recommendation that lower
courts apply two-step sequencing in qualified immunity analyses §1983 excessive force cases.
Such a qualification would provide that although courts generally have discretion in terms of
sequencing the qualified immunity analysis, §1983 claims for excessive force are a specific
instance of the type of case where sequencing would be “advantageous” as the Court in Pearson
acknowledged such cases more generally. 122 Some Justices who have generally been opposed to
Saucier sequencing have seemed to imply that excessive force cases are such an instance where
sequencing is advantageous. For example, Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Scott, a case involving
a claim of excessive force, seemed to think that addressing the constitutional question in that
instance was necessary despite his disagreement with Saucier generally.123 This call for a
qualification to the discretion granted in Pearson is necessary, because of the uniqueness of
excessive force claims in comparison to §1983 claims in other contexts. In an excessive force
case the §1983 damages claim is generally the only vehicle by which such plaintiffs can have
their Fourth Amendment rights vindicated. 124 Violations of other constitutional rights for which
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§1983 claims may also be brought enjoy the benefit of alternative and more easily attainable
remedies for vindicating their rights. In those instances, unlike in the excessive force context,
the§1983 claim is secondary. For example, in the Fourth Amendment search context a plaintiff
may seek damages under §1983 secondarily to their seeking exclusion of certain evidence in a
criminal trial.125 Again, in a §1983 Establishment Clause case the plaintiff may be seeking
damages as well as some type of injunctive or declaratory relief from for example mandatory
prayers as in Bunting.126 However, in excessive force claims §1983 damages are not an
alternative or secondary remedy, but rather the sole method by which such individuals can seek
to have such violations of their Fourth Amendment right vindicated. This is due in part to the
inherent nature of the violations. In the excessive force context the violating conduct is typically
a brief one-time occurrence, while for example in the context of an Establishment Clause case
the violation is likely ongoing.127 Accordingly, to ensure that plaintiffs in excessive force cases
are not perpetually denied the only remedy available to them for violations of their constitutional
rights, the law in this area must be allowed to develop. For this to happen the merits in §1983
excessive force cases should be addressed prior to the question qualified immunity question.
Allowing otherwise, as the broad discretion of Pearson currently permits, leaves open the
possibility that courts will avoid the constitutional question in these cases allowing officers to
repeatedly use the same types of excessive force, while at the same time denying each §1983
claim brought in relation to that force on qualified immunity grounds, because the law in the area

constitutional remedies--inhibiting the abusive and excess ive use of force by law enforcement. Although such
wrongs are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, illegal seizure is not the problem, and exclusion of evidence not
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never becomes clearly defined.128 For example, if an excessive force claim is brought under
§1983 for a police officer’s use of a taser, and lower courts grant qualified immunity without
ever reaching the constitutional question, officers will be able to continually reap the benefit of
qualified immunity despite the possibility that using a taser constitutes excessive force in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. To avoid these potential injustices, and to avoid turning the
unreasonable seizure provision of the Fourth Amendment into a shell of a right, the Supreme
Court should specify §1983 excessive force cases as a type of case in which Saucier sequencing
is “advantageous”.129 In addition to the suggestion that courts apply Saucier sequencing they
should also require that when courts decide not to answer the constitutional question in such
cases they should place on the record their reasons for doing so. This will help to ensure that
constitutional questions that warrant resolution are not avoided lazily in the excessive force
context where development of the law is most crucial.

VII. Conclusion
The availability of the qualified immunity defense in the §1983 context is crucial to the
proper functioning of law enforcement. Without the defense, police officers’ ability to carry out
their duties in dangerous and rapidly evolving situations might be severely stunted due to fear of
suit and liability. However, the discretion given to courts under Pearson in allowing them to
approach the qualified immunity analysis in whatever sequence they deem appropriate leaves
open the potential for serious instances of injustice, particularly in the §1983 excessive force
context. This potential injustice comes when courts avoid the constitutional question as to police
use of force, and resort to resolving the analysis by looking solely at the qualified immunity, or
128
129

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2156, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001).
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 225, 129 S. Ct. 808, 812, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009).

clearly established prong of the test. This potential stagnation of constitutional law in the Fourth
Amendment excessive force context is particularly troublesome, because unlike the Fourth
Amendment search context, where constitutional law has a chance to develop outside of §1983
through exclusionary rule jurisprudence, or the Establishment Clause context where the law can
develop through suits for injunctive or declaratory relief without concern for qualified immunity,
the only real way for constitutional law to develop in the Fourth Amendment excessive force
context is through the §1983 action itself. §1983 excessive force plaintiffs stand on unique
ground in comparison to plaintiffs asserting §1983 claims in other contexts. In other §1983
contexts, the §1983 action may be secondary to some other action for exclusion of the evidence
in a search case, injunctive relief in a case involving prayers, or declaratory judgment. 130 Such
alternatives are typically unavailable in excessive force cases, and therefore the §1983 claim for
damages is the primary vehicle by which such plaintiffs can seek to have the violation of their
rights vindicated.131 Accordingly, with the principles of Marbury v. Madison in mind, greater
care to protect plaintiffs’ rights in these cases should be taken. 132 To encourage this greater
protection the Supreme Court should specify excessive force cases as the type of case falling
under the umbrella noted in Pearson in which mandatory sequencing is “appropriate” and
“beneficial”.133 Further, notwithstanding the sometimes fact specific constitutional rulings that
result, the Court should strongly recommend that courts apply Saucier sequencing in analyzing
qualified immunity in §1983 excessive force cases. To that point, the fact specificity of the
constitutional determinations in excessive force case seems to pose less and less of an issue for
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courts as technology advances. This is clearly evidenced by the qualified immunity analysis in
Scott. The video in Scott seemed to make the fact bound inquiry fairly workable despite the
inherent nature of summary judgment. With excessive force cases coming to the forefront of
national consciousness, rampant use of cell phone cameras, and an increased use of body
cameras by police agencies across the country, it is likely that videos will be more readily
available in excessive force cases and courts will be able to rely on those video accounts of
address the constitutional issue summarily without resort to unnecessary judicial fact finding. In
addition to a strong suggestion that courts apply Saucier in the §1983 police excessive force
context for the reasons stated herein, the Court also needs to place a power check on lower courts
to ensure that they make their best efforts to adhere to this suggestion. Such a check on the
discretion granted in Pearson might include that when a lower court resolves qualified immunity
analysis without addressing the constitutional question in a §1983 excessive force case they must
place on the record their reasons for doing so, and the courts justifications should be appealable
by the plaintiff. These additional considerations to qualified immunity analysis will allow for
constitutional law in the area of police excessive force to develop from case to case, and provide
guidance to officials as to what the Constitution requires of them. Even when this development
of constitutional law and clarification of rights occurs in cases where officers who are found to
have used excessive force are granted qualified immunity anyway, concerns as to the
wastefulness or incorrectness of these prospective determinations are significantly reduced postCamreta. These suggested caveats to the generally broad discretion with which courts can
address qualified immunity are necessary in the §1983 excessive force context to legitimize the
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on police excessive force, and to ensure that violations of
peoples’ right to be free from unreasonable seizures at the hands of the police can be vindicated.

